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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards recently de-
scribed the lack of public or private enforcement action against bank di-
rectors in the United Kingdom in the wake of the financial crisis as “an 
accountability firewall.”1 Given that the primary fault of bank boards has 
been excessive risk taking and incompetence,2 one might have expected 
that these directors would have faced actions for failing to discharge their 
duty of care. The fact that the directors did not face such actions high-
lights the difficulty of holding directors accountable for negligent con-
duct. 
Not all would agree that this is problematic.3 The debate over the 
extent to which the directors’ duty of care should be enforced is long-
standing, and different jurisdictions adopt widely divergent approaches. 
In the United States, corporate law rarely holds directors of public com-
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 1. PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD, 
VOL. 1, 2013–14, H.L. 27-I, H.C. 175-I, at 10 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliame 
nt.uk/pa/jt201314/jtselect/jtpcbs/27/27.pdf. 
 2. As pointed out in a number of public reports: TREASURY COMMITTEE, THE RUN ON THE 
ROCK, VOL. 1, 2006–7, H.C. 56-I, at 19 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/56i.pdf; FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE FAILURE OF THE ROYAL BANK 
OF SCOTLAND, 2011, at 179 (U.K.) [hereinafter FSA], available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/othe 
r/rbs.pdf; PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, ‘AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO 
HAPPEN’: THE FAILURE OF HBOS, VOL. 1, 2012–13, H.L. 144, H.C. 705, at 51–52 (U.K.) [hereinaf-
ter HBOS REPORT], available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201213/jtselect/ 
jtpcbs/144/144.pdf. 
 3. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW, 93–100 (1996); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and 
the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1789–98 (2001). For a 
detailed review of the arguments for and against greater director accountability, see infra Part II. 
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panies accountable because of the business judgment rule and statutes 
permit corporations to exempt directors from monetary damages for 
breaching the duty.4 In Australia, in contrast, there have been a number 
of very high profile decisions in which the director’s statutory duty of 
care5 has been enforced through action taken by the Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission.6 Australia also has a common law and eq-
uitable duty of care, which is enforced privately.7 The United Kingdom, 
meanwhile, lies somewhere between the two. Under section 174 of the 
Companies Act of 2006, directors must exercise the care, skill, and dili-
gence of a reasonably diligent person in the director’s position.8 There is 
no business judgment rule, and the duty is subject to private enforcement 
only. Directors of financial institutions also have a regulatory duty to 
exercise “due skill, care and diligence in managing the business of the 
firm for which [they are] responsible,” which was originally enforceable 
by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and now by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) and Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA).9 
While Professor Coffee has suggested that enforcement intensity 
may matter more in promoting the impact of a law than its substantive 
content,10 the substantive content and how it is interpreted can affect the 
viability of enforcement. The financial crisis highlights the issue of 
whether directors’ conduct should be measured against a standard of care 
                                                        
 4. Notably under DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2011). 
 5. Actions have been taken under Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(1) (Austl.). 
 6. See ROBERT P. AUSTIN & IAN M. RAMSAY, FORD’S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS LAW 
¶¶ 8.305, 8.310 (15th ed. 2012). Australia also has a statutory business judgment rule under § 180(2) 
of the Corporations Act 2001, but it has only been successfully utilized in one case, Austl. Sec. & 
Invs. Comm’n v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] N.S.W.S.C. 1229 (Austl.). 
 7. AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 6, at para. 8.320. 
 8. In the United Kingdom, the duty of care is a common law, not a fiduciary, duty. Christopher 
M. Bruner, Is the Corporate Director’s Duty of Care a ‘Fiduciary’ Duty? Does It Matter?, 48 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1027, 1034–35 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2358616; see also William M. Heath, The Director’s ‘Fiduciary’ Duty of Care and Skill: A 
Misnomer, 25 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 370 (2007). 
 9. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., HANDBOOK, STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLE AND CODE OF PRACTICE 
FOR APPROVED PERSONS, APER 2.1A.3, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE 6 (2013). Individuals regulated 
by the FSA as approved persons will now be regulated by the PRA, the FCA, or both depending on 
what functions they perform and whether their firm is regulated by the FCA or both the PRA and the 
FCA. Some non-executive directors fall under both regimes, and some, perhaps most, executives 
will fall under both regimes. Fortunately, the provisions of APER can be treated as identical for all 
regimes. The government has recently indicated that in relation to deposit taking institutions, it will 
replace APER with a new “Senior Persons Regime” and Banking Standards Rules. HM TREASURY, 
GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, 2013, 
Cm. 8661, at 11–12 (U.K.). 
 10. John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
229, 233 (1997) (considering in particular the impact of enforcement on the development and growth 
of financial markets). 
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that is norm-setting or norm-reflecting, and if the latter, which norms 
these should be. The FSA’s decision not to take enforcement action 
against the directors of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) with respect to 
the takeover of ABN Amro illustrates this point. The largest takeover in 
banking history, and a key cause of RBS’s collapse, proceeded on the 
basis of a due diligence exercise comprising of two lever arch files and a 
CD.11 The FSA’s report on the collapse of RBS (the RBS Report) criti-
cized the due diligence exercise as wholly inadequate, but also concluded 
that there had been no contravention of any regulatory rules or principles 
partly because the exercise had been in line with market practice.12 In 
other words, the directors were exonerated because the FSA judged their 
conduct by a standard that reflected market norms. 
This Article examines and evaluates the role of market norms in de-
termining whether directors have acted reasonably and the appropriate-
ness of setting a standard of reasonableness that reflects market norms. It 
argues that although there are situations in which a standard that reflects 
market norms may not be appropriate for determining the reasonableness 
of a director’s conduct, it is the best standard more often than not. While 
this Article focuses on the U.K. director’s duty of care, the question of 
whether compliance with market norms should be exculpatory arises 
every time legal or regulatory enforcement depends upon establishing 
that a market actor has acted unreasonably. For example, the Financial 
Services and Markets Act of 2000 holds bank directors accountable for 
contraventions of regulatory requirements in their areas of responsibility 
unless they can demonstrate that they took all such steps as a person in 
their position could “reasonably be expected to take” to prevent this.13 
As the financial crisis and subsequent LIBOR scandal demon-
strated, market norms can be irrational, short-termist, inefficient, and 
even criminogenic. If, as a result, directors should be held to higher stan-
dards, it again raises a question of broader significance: namely, how one 
regulates through broad ex ante standards—the precise requirements of 
which can only be clarified ex post—in a manner that is fair to the regu-
lated but allows for the promotion of effective accountability.  
                                                        
 11. See FSA, supra note 2. 
 12. Id. at 33. 
 13. Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act, 2013 c. 33, § 32(2) (U.K.) (inserting § 66A(5)–
(6) and § 66B(5)–(6) into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000); see also PARLIAMENTARY 
COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 10; HM TREASURY, supra note 9, at 11. 
The new Act also creates a criminal offense under which bank directors and other senior managers 
can be found guilty of an offense of causing a financial institution to fail where their conduct falls 
“far below what could reasonably be expected of a person in their position.” Financial Services 
(Banking Reform) Act, § 36(1)(c). None of these sections are yet in force. 
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Part II of this Article addresses arguments for and against enforcing 
a requirement that directors act with reasonable care and argues that en-
forcement is important to promote accountability. Part III reviews the 
role market norms play in the standard of care set by the courts. Next, 
given that weakness in private enforcement in the United Kingdom has 
led to calls for public enforcement of directors’ duties,14 Part IV consid-
ers the approach of the U.K. financial service regulators to enforcing a 
regulatory duty of care. Part V argues that in both private and public en-
forcement, the standard of care should usually be norm-reflecting but 
then considers under what circumstances it might be permissible to en-
force norms ex post that are higher than those employed by the market. 
Finally, Part VI concludes by highlighting other issues raised by this Ar-
ticle. 
This Article uses a modified version of Eisenberg’s threefold classi-
fication to define what is meant by market norms.15 The first type com-
prises behavioral patterns, which entail no sense of obligation and are not 
self-consciously adhered to.16 The second, like the first type, entails no 
sense of obligation but are self-consciously adhered to, such as the prac-
tice of beginning and ending classes at a particular time:17 these practices 
could be changed without criticism. These two categories indicate types 
of behavior that are considered permissible, though not required,18 and 
together will be referred to as “market practices.” The third type consists 
of “obligational market norms”—non-legal rules or practices that actors 
both self-consciously adhere to and feel obliged to adhere to unless there 
are good reasons not to.19 These may be formal obligational norms such 
as those contained in codes of practice, industry standards, and instru-
ments such as the U.K. Corporate Governance Code. Although non-
legal, these will be referred to as “soft law” norms. There may also be 
“informal obligational norms” that reflect what market actors feel they 
ought to do. Finally, the term “market norms” refers to both market prac-
tices and obligational norms. 
                                                        
 14. John Armour, Enforcement Strategies, in RATIONALITY IN COMPANY LAW: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF DD PRENTICE 85 (John Armour & Jennifer Payne eds., 2009) (U.K.) (describing private 
enforcement as “close to nil” in public companies); see also Andrew R. Keay, Public Enforcement 
of Directors’ Duties 26–28 (Jan. 16, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2201598. 
 15. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1256–
57 (1999). 
 16. Id. at 1256. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1262. 
 19. Id. at 1256–57. 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF ENFORCEMENT 
There are several arguments against more rigorous enforcement of 
the director’s duty of care. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that private 
enforcement is unnecessary because the market adequately constrains 
directors’ conduct. Careless directors will see a drop in their corpora-
tion’s share price and will be dismissed or lose their jobs through a hos-
tile takeover.20 The concept of market discipline, however, has been 
much criticized in the wake of the financial crisis.21 Even in normal 
times, it is unclear that the market can accurately price for careless be-
havior.22 
There is also an argument that minimal enforcement is supported by 
the terms of a “hypothetical bargain” between directors and sharehold-
ers.23 The hypothetical bargain theory asks what parties, as rational bar-
gainers, would have bargained for in a given situation had they turned 
their minds to the issue or if the costs of bargaining for the term were 
sufficiently low.24 In bargaining for the content of the duty of care, 
shareholders, as rational bargainers, would take into account that strong 
enforcement could lead to over-deterrence and so would agree to a less 
onerous duty and limited enforcement.25 The hypothetical bargain analy-
sis has been criticised for its indeterminacy26 and for assuming that 
shareholders would contract for minimal performance with minimal ac-
countability. This is by no means self-evident. The rational bargainer 
might take into account that reducing directors’ incentives to take care 
could increase the probability that unreasonable risks will be taken, 
which could turn out to be more costly than imposing such incentives. 
It is not possible to judge whether fears that enforcement would 
over-deter risk taking and discourage people from taking up directorial 
                                                        
 20. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 95–96. 
 21. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. 
CORP. L. 265, 280–81 (2012). 
 22. Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability 
in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 120–21 (2006). 
 23. John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and 
the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 951 (1988). Some commentators 
acknowledge that the duty of care is owed to the company rather than shareholders but nevertheless 
take account only of the implications of the duty for directors and shareholders. See, e.g., Robert J. 
Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 
1166–67 (2006). 
 24. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 15. 
 25. Id. at 99–100. 
 26. Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1426–27 (1985); Coffee, supra note 23, at 952. 
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roles (unless they were inefficiently compensated for the risk27) are well 
founded.28 There is some evidence of a deterrent effect.29 Thus, empirical 
research indicated that criminal sanctions might have some chilling ef-
fect on directors’ decision making, but it did not demonstrate that this 
constituted over-deterrence or that civil enforcement would have similar 
effects.30 In the United States, insurance premiums rose after the decision 
in Smith v. Van Gorkom, and the protection provided by insurance poli-
cies was reduced. As a result, some directors resigned.31 In the United 
Kingdom, there is evidence that insurance for directors of financial insti-
tutions is becoming narrower in its coverage whilst premiums are rising. 
This is not, however, due to the unlikely prospect of the director’s duty 
of care being successfully enforced but is rather a response to liability 
fears consequent on the LIBOR scandal and securities litigation arising 
out of alleged non-disclosure in rights issues.32 Moreover, arguments that 
the duty of care cannot be enforced against directors do not deal with the 
fact that it is enforced in Australia—apparently without ill effects. In any 
event, although concerns about over-deterrence cannot be dismissed, the 
abject failure of enforcement of the duty of care suggests that there is 
some way to go before these fears would be realized. As the U.K. gov-
ernment recently commented, the current regime for enforcing directors’ 
duties in the United Kingdom “had an insufficient deterrent effect on 
bank directors’ behavior, and thereby failed to protect the public from 
harm.”33 
Those who support director immunity, or limited enforcement of 
the duty of care, often make the orthodox assumption that the corporation 
                                                        
 27. Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability Across Countries, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1389 (2006); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct 
from Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 445–46 (1993); Christopher 
A. Riley, The Company Director’s Duty of Care and Skill: The Case for an Onerous but Subjective 
Standard, 62 MOD. L. REV. 697, 712 (1999). 
 28. For arguments suggesting that they may be overstated, see Keay, supra note 14, at 26–28. 
 29. Coffee, supra note 23, at 927; Keay, supra note 14, at 27. 
 30. Robert Baldwin, The New Punitive Regulation, 67 MOD. L. REV. 351, 361–63 (2004). 
 31. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See Michael Bradley & Cindy Schipani, 
The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 32–35 
(1989). 
 32. Jane Croft, Insurance: Directors Take Action Against Rising Tide of Litigation, FIN. TIMES 
(Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b6920752-a678-11e2-bc0b-00144feabdc0.html#axz 
z2uCZniDfh; Jennifer Thompson & Caroline Binham, RBS Faces Second Lawsuit on Rights Issue, 
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ed1911bc-9c55-11e2-9a4b-00144feabdc0.htm 
l#axzz2uCZniDfh. 
 33. HM TREASURY, supra note 9, at 25. 
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functions to promote shareholder interests34 and that only shareholders 
have an interest in whether directors manage corporations carefully and 
in whether the duty of care should be enforced. Thus, the hypothetical 
contract account tends to focus on what risks shareholders would have 
consented to and ignores other groups because it views the duty of care 
as a term of the corporate contract between only the shareholders and 
directors.35 
Academics such as David Millon have challenged the assumption 
that corporations should be run in shareholder interests alone.36 But even 
if this proposition is accepted, it does not follow that only shareholders 
have an interest in corporations being run competently. Society may re-
quire corporations to be run in shareholder interests because that is the 
best way to create wealth, for example, and there would be a public in-
terest in enforcing the duty of care insofar as this promoted the goal of 
competently run companies.37 Treating the enforcement of the director’s 
duty of care as a purely private matter between shareholders and direc-
tors is particularly problematic in dispersed share-ownership corpora-
tions where the costs of negligent conduct are visited on other stake-
holders and society. This points to another reason for enforcement, 
namely the need for accountability. 
Accountability is a notoriously slippery concept but refers here to a 
process with the following core features: that persons (the directors) are 
obliged to recount, explain, and justify their conduct to a third party who 
                                                        
 34. Riley, supra note 27, at 706. Although Riley acknowledges that the position alters when the 
company becomes insolvent. Id. at 721–22.; see also Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Is-
lands of Conscious Power: Law Norms and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
1619, 1658–59 (2001). Others, though, seek to insulate directors from shareholder pressure so that 
they can make decisions that support the interests of a wider range of constituents. See KENT 
GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE 
POSSIBILITIES ch. 9 (2006); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability 
and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 428–29 (2001). Blair and 
Stout argue that the market and internal motivations to “do the right thing” adequately constrain 
directors. Blair & Stout, supra, at 443.  
 35. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 17, 25, 99–100 (also denying any third-party 
effects).  
 36. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 34, at ch. 1, 3; David Millon, New Directions in Corpo-
rate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1373 (1993); David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law 
Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., Westview Press 
1995). 
 37. Ross B. Grantham, The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders, 57 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 554, 577–78, 584–86 (1998). Making the case that there is a public interest in 
companies being run competently (though not that this requires that they be run in shareholders’ 
interests), see Keay, supra note 14, at 35–37. For a critique of the argument that running companies 
in shareholders’ interests serves the public interest, see GREENFIELD, supra note 34, at 22–27. 
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can ask questions, debate the persons’ conduct, and pass judgment.38 
Although sanctions are not an essential element of accountability, conse-
quences (or the possibility of consequences) being visited on those held 
to account are required.39 
As Justin O’Brien has pointed out, imposing accountability on cor-
porate actors cuts against the facilitative underpinnings of corporate 
law,40 although in the United Kingdom, unlike in the United States, the 
director’s duty of care is a mandatory provision that cannot be contracted 
out of.41 Accountability, however, is necessary for two separate though 
often overlapping reasons. The first is agency.42 As directors have been 
delegated the power to manage the corporations’ affairs, they are liable 
to account to their principals for the manner in which that power is exer-
cised. This would justify private enforcement and accountability to the 
corporation, and through it to the shareholders, and fits well both with 
the economic theory that views directors as (non-legal) agents for share-
holders43 and with directors’ legal position as agents for the corporation. 
A second important reason for accountability arises when an actor’s 
conduct has harmed the rights or interests of others.44 The more im-
portant those interests are—and the more serious the harm—the more 
pressing the demand for accountability. Directors in dispersed share-
ownership corporations make decisions that can harm the interests of a 
wide range of persons both within and outside the corporation. Holding 
them to account in such circumstances is important because it gives those 
                                                        
 38. Mark Bovens, Thomas Schillemans & Paul ‘t Hart, Does Public Accountability Work? An 
Assessment Tool, 86 PUB. ADMIN. 225, 225 (2008); Richard Mulgan, “Accountability”: An Ever 
Expanding Concept?, 78 PUB. ADMIN. 555, 555 (2000).  
 39. Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, Promoting Accountability in Multilevel Governance: A 
Network Approach, 13 EUR. L.J. 542, 545 (2007). 
 40. Justin O’Brien, Snaring Leopards: Tracking the Efficacy of Financial Regulatory Reform 
in the Aftermath of the Crisis, 12 OR. REV. INT’L L. 213, 222 (2010); see also Michael P. Dooley & 
E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current 
ALI Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. LAW.  503, 522 (1989) (in relation to the business judgment rule).  
 41. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 232 (U.K.). 
 42. Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 38, 39 (2000); Amir 
N. Licht, Accountability and Corporate Governance 20 (Sept. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=328401. 
 43. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 44. RICHARD MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO ACCOUNT: ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN 
DEMOCRACIES 12–14 (2003); see also Deirdre Curtin & Linda Senden, Public Accountability of 
Transnational Private Regulation: Chimera or Reality?, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 163, 169 (2011) (arguing 
that accountability to wider group is necessary when actors have a “considerable impact” on others 
and are “choice-determining” for them). 
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others a voice and demonstrates that their interests count.45 The process 
of being held accountable forces directors to acknowledge the harm that 
they have caused and accept its impact on others and, in doing so, shows 
respect for those others as persons and treats them as ends in themselves 
rather than as means to an end.46 The mechanism of accountability 
through enforcement provides a state-sanctioned channel for the expres-
sion of legitimate anger and indignation of those who have been harmed, 
whilst its absence allows anger to fester and entrenches feelings of injus-
tice and unequal treatment, created by the perception that, in this context, 
directors are beyond the reach of the law.47 Thus, the absence of proceed-
ings to hold directors accountable following the financial crisis breached 
societal expectations and undermined the legitimacy of, and trust in, the 
law and regulatory framework.48 Private enforcement by shareholders 
would not necessarily achieve these accountability goals as far as persons 
other than the shareholders were concerned, which points towards the 
need for enforcement by a regulator. Moreover, enforcement is more, 
rather than less, necessary to promote accountability to non-shareholders 
because, unlike shareholders, they have no means of holding directors 
directly accountable. 
The drive for accountability, however, should not lead to directors 
being made scapegoats; this would be unjust and could itself undermine 
the law’s legitimacy. Rather, they must be held to an appropriate stand-
ard of care, and in determining that standard, it will be argued that mar-
ket norms must play a part. 
III. THE STANDARD OF CARE AND MARKET NORMS 
This Part considers what account courts and regulators have taken 
of market norms in assessing the reasonableness of directors’ conduct. 
The lack of case law on the directors’ duty of care means that to obtain 
an informed overview of the courts’ approach, it is necessary to consider 
case law under other provisions that involve assessments of reasonable-
ness or competence.49 The absence of private enforcement renders public 
                                                        
 45. Licht, supra note 42, at 29–30; Glen Staszewski, Reason—Giving and Accountability, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1286–87 (2009). 
 46. Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765, 
1793, 1806 (2009). 
 47. Id. at 1785–91, 1808–09. 
 48. See, for example, criticism in PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, 
CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD, VOL. II, 2013–14, H.L. 27-II, H.C. 175-II, at 142–48 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201314/jtselect/jtpcbs/27/27ii.pdf. 
 49. Examples of provisions that involve assessments of reasonableness or competence include 
the Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214 (U.K.), which provides that directors can be ordered to con-
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enforcement of the regulatory duty of care more important as an ac-
countability mechanism; thus, the financial services regulators’ approach 
is also considered. 
A. The Courts 
Courts take little account of market norms, and this may be contrib-
uting to under-enforcement of the duty of care. Historically, the standard 
of care at common law incorporated the low social and market expecta-
tions of directors of the time.50 Thus, the seminal case of In Re City Equi-
table Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. held that directors would only breach their 
duty if they failed to exercise the care and skill that they in fact pos-
sessed.51 By 1969, the standards adhered to by the courts were described 
as “legacies of outmoded economic and social philosophies from another 
age.”52 Yet little changed. An Edinburgh solicitor in 1982 observed that 
although the law only required directors to attend board meetings inter-
mittently whenever they reasonably could, commercial expectations of 
directors in public corporations were much higher.53 
The early-1990s saw the introduction of a more stringent standard, 
partly as a result of legislative developments and partly as a judicial reac-
tion to a change in public attitudes towards corporate governance in the 
wake of a spate of corporate scandals in the early part of the decade.54 
Looking to the standard set by § 214(4) of the Insolvency Act of 1986, 
the courts held that directors had to show the skill and care of   
a reasonably diligent person having both (a) the general knowledge, 
skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person 
carrying out the same functions as are carried out by that director in 
relation to the company, and (b) the general knowledge, skill and 
experience that that director has.55  
                                                                                                                            
tribute to an insolvent company’s assets if they knew or ought to have concluded that there was no 
reasonable prospect that it would avoid going into insolvent liquidation, and the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act, 1986, c. 46, § 6 (U.K.), which provides that courts must disqualify directors of 
insolvent companies if satisfied that their conduct as directors of those companies makes them unfit 
to be concerned in the management of a company. 
 50. See, for example, the account taken of commercial practice in In Re Forest of Dean Coal 
Mining Co. (1878) 10 Ch.D. 450, 452 (U.K.). For further discussion, see Heath, supra note 8, at 391. 
 51. In Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., [1925] 1 Ch. 407 (U.K.). 
 52. M. J. Trebilcock, The Liability of Company Directors for Negligence, 32 MOD. L. REV. 
499, 509 (1969). 
 53. Allan MacKenzie, A Company Director’s Obligations of Care and Skill, J. BUS. L. 460, 
462 (1982). 
 54. See Bishopsgate Inv. Mgmt. Ltd. v. Maxwell (No. 2), [1993] B.C.L.C. 1282, 1285 (U.K.). 
 55. Norman v. Theodore Goddard, [1992] B.C.L.C. 14 (U.K.); In Re D’Jan of London Ltd., 
[1993] B.C.L.C 646 (U.K.). 
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This imposed a mixed objective and subjective standard, with the former 
establishing a minimum standard expected of all directors and the latter 
raising the standard where the director possessed a special skill. The pre-
sent § 174 of the Companies Act of 2006 codifies this standard. 
While the standard of care has been settled in broad terms, the ques-
tion of how the courts judge whether a director has displayed the skill 
and care of “a reasonably diligent person,” and whether this is a norm-
setting or norm-reflecting exercise, is unresolved. In addressing it, regard 
could be had to the approach taken in tort law. There is considerable de-
bate amongst academics over what constitutes the goals of both tort and 
corporate law,56 and the extent to which their goals overlap is conten-
tious.57 Nevertheless in tort law, at least when the parties are participants 
in a market, the standard of care required of market participants should 
usually reflect what they would have contracted for had they turned their 
minds to the matter. Arguably, a standard set by reference to market 
norms reflects the parties’ expectations and embodies the hypothetical 
term.58 Given that contractarians argue that corporate law provides par-
ties with a set of default standard terms that they would have chosen for 
themselves,59 the approach taken in these tort cases may therefore be per-
tinent when determining how to establish the standard of conduct that 
should be expected of a reasonable director.60 Again, insofar as corporate 
law is concerned with setting mandatory standards of conduct,61 this 
leaves open the question as to how such standards should be set. The tort 
law approach of setting an objective standard of reasonableness by refer-
ence to market norms is potentially instructive. 
Yet while the courts in tort cases generally adopt a norm-reflecting 
approach and admit evidence regarding recognized and established prac-
                                                        
 56. For an overview of the debate in corporate law, see, for example, John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1618 (1989). For a good review of many of the theories of tort law, see Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed 
Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 
1802–11 (1997). On the important theory of civil recourse in tort law, see John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse Defended: A Reply to Posner, Chamallas, and Robinette, 88 
IND. L.J. 569 (2013) and the references cited therein. 
 57. Kenneth B. Davis Jr., Once More, The Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573, 
575–76; Rhee, supra note 23, at 1156–57. 
 58. Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine, Inc., 984 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 59. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 15. 
 60. Rhee, supra note 23, at 1165, 1170. 
 61. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1473–
74 (1989). 
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tices within a particular industry when assessing reasonableness,62 this is 
not done in corporate law. Thus, in Secretary of State v. Baker, the de-
fendant director argued that expert evidence would assist the court in 
determining what the notional “reasonably skilled and diligent person” 
might have done in his situation and that without it, the court lacked the 
requisite experience or skill to identify the standard against which to 
measure his behavior.63 Holding that the expert evidence was irrelevant 
and inadmissible, the court dismissed the assertion that this left it “in the 
position of attempting to reach a decision on the appropriate and reason-
able practice of a manager of a derivatives business within a complex 
global investment bank without any relevant evidence from a member of 
that profession.”64 On appeal, the court held that “[t]he standard of com-
petence to be shown by a person as a director is . . . [a question] of law. 
Whether the respondent failed to achieve that standard is a question for 
the court on which only [in exceptional circumstances] could the evi-
dence of an expert be admissible.”65 
Secretary of State v. Baker was a disqualification case, and the 
court drew a distinction between disqualification and professional negli-
gence claims,66 which left open the possibility that expert evidence about 
market practices might be admitted in duty of care cases. This generally 
has not occurred, although there have been some exceptions. In a recent 
case, a first instance court did show regard to independent expert evi-
dence on the question of whether there was a relevant market practice 
indicating how a director should handle a particular commercial situa-
tion—there was not. The court also took into account the expert evidence 
in order to find that the director was not in breach of his duty of care.67 
                                                        
 62. Stokes v. Guest, Keen and Nettlefold (Bolts and Nuts) Ltd., [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1776, 1783 
(Swanwick, J.) (U.K.); Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd. v. Hett Stubbs & Kemp, [1979] 1 Ch. 384, 405 
(Oliver, J.) (U.K.); Baker v. Quantum Clothing Grp. Ltd., [2011] UKSC 17; [2011] 1 W.L.R. 1003, 
[10] (U.K.). The standard of care in tort is not conclusively established by industry practices: it is no 
defense to a charge of negligence that others are just as negligent. Thompson v. Smiths Shiprepairers 
(North Shields) Ltd., [1984] Q.B. 405, 416 (U.K.). 
 63. Secretary of State v. Baker, [1999] 1 B.C.L.C. 433, 492 (U.K.). 
 64. Id. at 495. 
 65. Secretary of State v. Baker, [2000] 1 B.C.L.C. 523, [39] (U.K.). 
 66. Baker, [1999] 1 B.C.L.C. at 495; Baker, [2000] 1 B.C.L.C. at [39] (U.K.). 
 67. ARB International Ltd. v. Baillie, [2013] EWHC (Comm) 2060, [7]–[8], [32], [57]–[58] 
(U.K.); see also Abbey Forwarding Ltd. (In Liquidation) v. Hone, [2010] EWHC (Ch) 2029, [198], 
[205] (U.K.) (stating that as no expert evidence regarding commercial practice was adduced, the case 
was not proven and the directors were exonerated); Barings PLC (In Liquidation) v. Coopers & 
Lybrand (A Firm), [2002] P.N.L.R. 22, [51]–[52] (U.K.) (expert evidence on the management of 
investment banks engaging in futures and derivatives trading admitted to assess director’s negligence 
and bank’s contributory negligence). The Barings decision was part of the same group of litigation 
as Secretary of State v. Baker. See Baker, [1999] 1 B.C.L.C. at 433. 
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Meanwhile although some have argued that the courts can take account 
of soft law norms,68 there is little evidence that they do so.69 Rather, 
judges place themselves in the directors’ shoes and reach their conclu-
sions about reasonableness using judicial intuition70 based on “largely 
tacit assessments of what is fair and socially valuable.”71 Whether this is 
in fact a socially valuable approach will be considered shortly. 
It is unclear whether this process results in a standard of care that 
fortuitously reflects market standards or if it varies and how. It seems 
possible that the courts seek to compensate for their lack of expertise in 
business matters, for the difficulties of assessing complex business deci-
sions,72 and for the risk of hindsight bias, by giving directors the benefit 
of the doubt, resulting in the enforcement of a lower standard of care and 
the exoneration of careless directors.73 There is evidence, for example, 
that the courts are applying a test of irrationality rather than reasonable-
ness in assessing directors’ conduct.74 The fact that the courts take little 
account of market norms may therefore be contributing to under-
enforcement of the duty of care. 
                                                        
 68. PAUL L. DAVIES, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 492–93 (8th ed. 2008). 
 69. On the contrary, in unfair prejudice claims under the Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 994 
(U.K.), the courts have refused to allow shareholders to rely on breaches of soft law norms to estab-
lish unfair prejudice. In Re Astec (BSR) PLC, [1999] B.C.C. 59 (U.K.). In ARB Int’l Ltd. v. Baillie, 
[2013] EWHC (Comm) 2060, [9]–[10] (U.K.), the judge refused to apply soft law norms—the Lon-
don & International Insurance Brokers’ Association Best Practice Market Guidelines—to judge a 
director negligent on the basis that the soft law norms had not become the market standard. 
 70. See, e.g., In Re Welfab Eng’rs, [1990] B.C.C. 600, 602–03 (U.K.); Brian D. Pierson (Con-
tractors) Ltd., [1999] B.C.C. 26, 43 (U.K.); Roberts v. Frohlich, [2011] EWHC (Ch) 257; [2012] 
B.C.C 407, [101]–[08] (U.K.); In Re Cont’l Assurance of London Ltd., [2007] 2 B.C.L.C. 287, [422] 
(U.K.). 
 71. Stephen G. Gilles, The Emergence of Cost-Benefit Balancing in English Negligence Law, 
77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 8 (2002). 
 72. For an account of the complex “real world situations” faced by directors, see Bayless Man-
ning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director’s Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 BUS. 
LAW. 1477, 1481–85, 1490–92 (1984). For a rebuttal of the argument that this process is too arcane 
for the courts, see Rhee, supra note 23, at 1151–52. 
 73. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 92. 
 74. This is not a recent development. Sarah Worthington, The Duty to Monitor: A Modern 
View of the Director’s Duty of Care, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY LAW 2, 181, 191 (Fiona 
Patfield ed., 1997). See, e.g., Roberts v. Frohlich, [2011] EWHC (Ch) 257; [2012] B.C.C. 407, [108] 
(U.K.) (court asking whether “no reasonably competent director could have made the judgment”). 
This echoes the standard of irrationality applied to administrative decisions. Associated Provincial 
Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K.B. 223 at 230 (U.K.) (decision will be struck 
down only if it is “so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it”). 
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B. The Regulators 
Directors of financial institutions have a regulatory duty under the 
Statement of Principles for Approved Persons (APER), Principle 6, to 
exercise “due skill, care and diligence in managing the business of the 
firm for which [they are] responsible.”75 
Regulatory judgments about the reasonableness of a director’s be-
havior are key to establishing compliance with Principle 6. The FSA took 
a norm-reflecting approach when assessing the takeover of ABN Amro, 
stating that because the due diligence conducted by RBS had been in line 
with market practices, and because there were no relevant general stand-
ards or codes of practice, it could not take enforcement action unless “the 
takeover was not just a bad decision but one which, viewed at the time, 
was beyond a range of reasonable responses.”76 Thus, in the absence of 
soft law norms, the FSA deferred to market practices. 
Subsequently, however, individuals have been unsuccessful in 
seeking to rely on the RBS Report to argue that the regulator must ad-
duce expert evidence either of market norms or of how other responsible 
individuals in a similar position might act.77 In the action taken against 
Peter Cummings, the only bank director to face formal FSA sanctions 
with respect to the conduct that ruined the banks, the FSA’s response to 
this argument was simply that it had assessed the reasonableness of 
Cummings’s conduct and decided that his actions were not those of a 
person in his position acting with due care and diligence.78 Again, the 
CEO of Prudential contended that he should not be disciplined if other 
credible persons in his position might have acted as he did or considered 
his conduct to be in compliance with his regulatory obligations.79 Never-
theless, the FSA proceeded to find him at fault in the absence of expert 
evidence on these points.80 
The proceedings for Prudential’s CEO were administrative in na-
ture, but disciplined persons can refer their cases to the specialist Upper 
                                                        
 75. FCA/PRA HANDBOOKS, APER 2.1A.3 (FCA), APER 2.1B.3 (PRA). 
 76. FSA, supra note 2, at 408. 
 77. Final Notice: Peter Cummings, FIN. SERVICES AUTHORITY, ¶ 5.4–.7 (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ static/pubs/final/peter-cummings.pdf. Cummings also argued that the FSA 
failed to discharge the requisite burden of proof. The more serious the allegations made against a 
person the higher the standard of proof required. FS & M Tribunal, Hoodless & Blackwell v. FSA, 
¶ 21 (Oct. 3, 2003), available at www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Decisions/Financial.htm; FS 
& M Tribunal, Legal & Gen. Assurance Soc’y Ltd. v. FSA, ¶ 19 (Jan. 18, 2005), available at 
www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Decisions/Financial.htm. 
 78. Final Notice: Peter Cummings, supra note 77, ¶¶ 5.44, 5.68. 
 79. Final Notice: Cheick Tidjane Thiam, FIN. SERVICES AUTHORITY, ¶ 6.4 (Mar. 27, 2013), 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/mr-cheick-tidjane-thiam.pdf. 
 80. Id. ¶ 6.5. 
2014] Breaching the Accountability Firewall 1003 
Tribunal (Tax and Chancery)—formerly the Financial Services and Mar-
kets Tribunal—a judicial body with the power to rehear cases.81 The Up-
per Tribunal (Tax and Chancery) has rejected arguments that expert evi-
dence of market practices needs to be adduced in order to assess whether 
a person’s conduct falls below regulatory standards.82 It has even rejected 
FSA expert evidence regarding what a reasonable CEO would do in a 
disciplined director’s position, remarking that this trespassed on the Tri-
bunal’s role.83 
The FSA did not and the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery) does 
not explicitly refer to market practices in making assessments of reason-
ableness. It is unclear what the FCA’s approach will be.84 It is likely that 
these bodies take account of their own specialized knowledge of market 
practices in assessing conduct,85 but it is unclear whether this leads to the 
application of market reflecting standards. However, like the courts, they 
also apply a standard of irrationality when assessing conduct.86 
In contrast to the lack of clarity surrounding ex post interpretations 
of reasonableness, the regulators are prepared to articulate norm-
reflecting standards ex ante. Market norms feed into this process through 
“the regulatory conversation”—a dialogue between the regulator and the 
regulated used to flesh out the meanings of broad standards through 
guidance and so forth.87 The FSA also endorsed guidance drawn up by 
                                                        
 81. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, §§ 55, 133 (U.K.). 
 82. FS & M Tribunal, Legal and Gen. Assurance Soc’y Ltd., supra note 77, ¶ 18; Upper Tribu-
nal (Tax and Chancery), Thommes v. FSA, [2012] UKUT B29 (TCC), [27]–[29], available at 
http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Decisions.htm. 
 83. Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery), Pottage v. FSA, [2012] UKUT (TCC), [178] (Apr. 20, 
2012), available at http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Decisions.htm. 
 84. The FCA has indicated that it will take account of market practices when assessing breach-
es of the Listings Rules. FCA HANDBOOK, DEPP 6.5B (13)(0). The PRA is silent on the issue. THE 
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY’S APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT: STATUTORY STATEMENTS 
OF POLICY AND PROCEDURE (2013). In market abuse cases the FSA had indicated that it would 
usually assess conduct by reference to market standards of behavior, but would not always consider 
such standards acceptable nor that the person was reasonable in adhering to them. Final Notice: 
Darren Morton, FIN. SERVICES AUTHORITY, ¶ 6.11–.12 (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ 
pubs/final/morton.pdf; see also FCA HANDBOOK, ENFORCEMENT GUIDE ¶ 4.14(2)–(3) (2013) [here-
inafter ENFORCEMENT GUIDE] (evidence of industry practices and market standards taken into ac-
count during investigations). The FCA has indicated that it would take account of previous FSA 
decisions when taking disciplinary action, and although its most recent guidance refers only to pre-
vious FCA decisions, it seems likely that FSA decisions will remain relevant. ENFORCEMENT GUIDE, 
supra, ¶ 5.22–.23. 
 85. See, e.g., FS & M Tribunal, Legal and Gen. Assurance Soc’y Ltd., supra note 77, ¶ 18 
(expert evidence admitted but Tribunal disregarded it as its members’ backgrounds in financial ser-
vices enabled them to assess the relevant issues independently). 
 86. Pottage , supra note 83, ¶ 151 (conduct must fall “outside the bounds of reasonableness”). 
 87. Julia Black, Talking About Regulation, 1 PUB. L. 77, 78–79 (1998). The dialogue can take 
many forms including formal consultations, or informally during firm supervisions. 
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the industry,88 which meant that those who followed the guidance would 
avoid enforcement action, and the FCA is following suit.89 Nevertheless, 
the FSA was prepared to challenge market norms if they conflicted with 
its regulatory objectives,90 and industry guidance had to specifically ad-
dress compliance with the FSA’s, and now FCA’s, own standards in its 
handbook.91 
IV. THE PROPER ROLE OF MARKET NORMS 
A. Respecting Market Norms 
Contrary to the position generally taken by the courts and regula-
tors, the standard of reasonableness applied to directors’ conduct should, 
for the most part, explicitly reflect market norms. This position does not 
go as far as Richard A. Epstein’s, which asserts that market practices that 
amount to customs should be conclusive evidence of reasonable conduct 
as between the parties to that custom.92 Epstein argues that customs arise 
when parties in equal relationships with identical or parallel roles—such 
as merchants—must agree on a way to deal with high-frequency, low-
cost contingencies.93 As a repeat player, the party who loses out from the 
custom in the short run will benefit from an optimal rule in the long run. 
As Epstein states, “a general rule that offers one side benefits today is 
almost certain to work against the winning party in some future transac-
tion.”94 Given this, what counts to market participants is not the gains 
and losses arising in a particular transaction, but the long-term gains to 
the market of an efficient custom.95 Customs should, therefore, be re-
spected because they optimize the parties’ joint welfare.96 However, as 
enforcement of the duty of care is not solely concerned with the aggre-
                                                        
 88. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CONFIRMATION OF INDUSTRY GUIDANCE: FEEDBACK ON DP06/5 
(2007) [hereinafter FEEDBACK ON DP06/5], available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps0 
7_16.pdf. 
 89. Industry Guidance, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.fca.org.uk/firm 
s/being-regulated/meeting-your-obligations/guidance/Industry-guidance; FCA HANDBOOK, DEPP 
6.2.1G(4). 
 90. See the discussion of FSA’s Treating Customers Fairly Initiative in David Campbell & 
Joan Loughrey, The Regulation of Self-interest in Financial Markets, in INTEGRITY, RISK AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN CAPITAL MARKETS 65, 70–74 (Justin O’Brien & George Gilligan eds., 2013). 
 91. FEEDBACK ON DP06/5, supra note 88, at 7. 
 92. Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in 
the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1992). 
 93. Id. at 11–14. 
 94. Id. at 12. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 11–14. 
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gate welfare of the parties to the corporate contract—namely, directors 
and shareholders, or corporations—even if their aggregate welfare was 
promoted by respecting market norms, this cannot conclude the debate 
about the desirability of respecting those norms.97 
In any event, it seems unlikely that directors engage in the kinds of 
transactions in which customs arise—i.e., high-frequency, low-cost 
transactions. On the contrary, as far as dealing with third parties are con-
cerned, directors are more likely to be involved in low-frequency, high-
cost strategic decisions, such as takeover decisions. Epstein’s analysis 
also does not seem apt for describing the dealings between corporations 
and their directors. It has been suggested that market custom might jus-
tify the fact that, in the United States, directors are liable for breaching 
their duty of care only where they fail to make informed decisions, abdi-
cate their duty, or act in bad faith.98 However in English law, custom re-
fers to actual practices that are prevalent in an industry or trade, and there 
is little evidence of such a market custom. For starters, decisions regard-
ing directors’ liability are taken by the courts and not by market actors. 
Arguably, if legal action was only taken in the circumstances outlined, 
this might be evidence of custom, but a more likely explanation is that 
potential claimants would know that only claims on these grounds would 
be successful, and they would therefore be deterred from litigating in 
other circumstances. 
Nevertheless, there are several arguments for setting a standard of 
conduct that falls neither below nor above, but rather reflects market 
practices and obligational norms. Broad standards such as reasonableness 
have been criticized as so objectionably vague as to offend against the 
Rule of Law, which requires that those subject to a law should be able 
“to foresee with fair certainty” how it will be applied and plan their af-
fairs accordingly.99 On the other hand: 
[W]hilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train exces-
sive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace with changing 
circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in 
                                                        
 97. Because, as Epstein says, custom only registers the preferences of parties to the custom and 
not those of affected third parties. Id. at 5; see also Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Com-
plex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1643, 1679, 1684 (1996). 
 98. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also Rhee, 
supra note 23, at 1116–67. 
 99. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 75–81 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2007) (1944). 
This is one reason that Bentham famously excoriated the common law as “dog law.” 5 JEREMY 
BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 235–36 (John Bowring ed., 1843). My thanks to 
Professor David Campbell for drawing my attention to this. 
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terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose in-
terpretation and application are questions of practice.100 
Given the range of tasks directors perform, the law could not possi-
bly prescribe in sufficient detail what constitutes desirable conduct in all 
situations. Attempts to provide detailed prescriptions would, in fact, un-
dermine certainty by creating complexity.101 The use of broad standards 
is therefore both inevitable and desirable. The problem of unpredictabil-
ity, however, could be ameliorated if the standard of reasonableness was 
given content by reference to externally generated ex ante norms.102 The 
question is whether these should be market norms or other types of norm, 
and how these should be identified. 
A standard that reflects market practices would avoid legislating for 
a standard of behavior that was higher than common practice and thus 
the potential unfairness of “punishing” a director for doing what every-
one else is doing.103 The problem with this consideration is that it applies 
regardless of whether market practices are otherwise desirable (for ex-
ample, because they are welfare maximizing).104 
Second, as Judge Learned Hand stated in T.J. Hooper, “in most 
cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence.”105 The fact that 
a practice is widespread will often, though certainly not always,106 point 
to its utility and will usually be a more reliable indicator of efficient con-
duct than the courts’ or regulators’ intuitive assessments. Evidence of 
market practices performs an epistemic function, indicating what might 
be a realistic standard of care and avoiding the dangers of hindsight bias, 
which causes people to overestimate after the event the extent to which 
an event could have been predicted beforehand.107 Hindsight bias could 
lead to directors being found negligent for consequences they could not 
have reasonably foreseen, or which seemed remote at the time of the de-
cision. 
                                                        
 100. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, (1979) 2 EHRR 245, at para. 49 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 101. CHARLES SAMPFORD, RETROSPECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 269–72 (2006). 
 102. As was accepted in R (Heather Moor & Edgecomb Ltd.) v. Fin. Ombudsman Serv., 
[2008] EWCA (Civ) 642, [2008] Bus. L.R. 1486, [49]. 
 103. Kenneth S. Abraham, Custom, Noncustomary Practice, and Negligence, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1784, 1798 (2009). 
 104. Id. at 1801. 
 105. T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). Though Judge Hand immediately proceeded 
to make clear that custom was not conclusive. 
 106. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 
1711–23 (1996). 
 107. Hal R. Arkles & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. The Business Judgment Rule: 
Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 588 (1994). 
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Third, measuring directors’ conduct against market practices and 
obligational norms will usually meet the expectations of shareholders, 
creditors, and other corporate stakeholders. As Sealy argued, “What the 
law has to ensure is that the risks which [the] company elects to embrace 
fall within the range of legitimate business risks, consistently with the 
expectations of all those whose interests are at stake . . . .”108 Legitimate 
business risks comprise those that are “acceptable . . . by the commercial 
standards of [the] day.”109 Corporate constituents are unlikely to want 
directors to take risks that the market considers unacceptable, and it 
seems equally unlikely that they would want directors to be more risk 
averse, given the implications for the corporation’s competitiveness.110 
Fourth, setting a standard that is higher than the market’s would re-
sult in a whole industry being found negligent.111 The consequential dis-
ruption of commercial practices and resulting uncertainty is more likely 
to result in over-deterrence and defensive decision making. Conversely, 
setting the standard by reference to market practice reduces these risks: 
successful directors tend to overestimate their abilities and underestimate 
the likelihood that they will be negligent.112 They will not tend to see 
themselves as liable to behave in ways that fall below market norms. If 
anything they are likely to believe that they will perform better than the 
market. 
Finally, finding directors liable could erode directors’ internal 
commitments to careful behavior, by signaling that others are not behav-
ing carefully.113 Setting the standard of reasonableness above market 
standards would increase the likelihood of directors being found liable, 
which would exacerbate this risk. Conversely, setting a standard that re-
flected market practices would signal that the requisite conduct was 
commonplace, thus ameliorating this problem. 
Not only are there problems in setting a standard of reasonableness 
that is above market norms, there are also problems in setting a lower 
standard. Duty of care cases promote improved standards of conduct by 
                                                        
 108. Leonard S. Sealy, Directors’ “Wider” Responsibilities—Problems Conceptual, Practical 
and Procedural, 13 MONASH U. L. REV. 164, 181 (1987) (Austl.). Sealy was arguing against direc-
tors having a duty other than to promote shareholder interests. 
 109. Id. 
 110. For a discussion of shareholders’ expectations as a limit on directors’ discretion and its 
implications for the duty of care, see Philip C. Sorenson, Discretion and its Limits—An Analytical 
Framework for Understanding and Applying the Duty of Care to Corporate Directors (And Others), 
66 WASH. U. L.Q. 553, 584–85 (1988). 
 111. Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1147–48 (1942). 
 112. Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and the 
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 825 (2001). 
 113. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 1772–73, 1796–97. 
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providing courts or regulators with the opportunity to clarify and rein-
force obligational norms of careful behavior.114 The corollary of this is 
that articulating a standard lower than the markets could introduce and 
reinforce suboptimal norms. Promoting a low standard (or not enforcing 
one at all) removes an incentive for those individuals who are motivated 
by external factors to act more carefully, thus encouraging poor practic-
es.115 Social and internal motivations for compliance may also be weak-
ened as non-enforcement, or enforcement of a low standard, signals that 
more careful behavior does not really count, which may degrade obliga-
tional norms.116 
This claim might seem implausible given that, for a substantial pe-
riod of time, market norms governing the care, skill, and diligence re-
quired of U.K. directors were higher than that required by the courts. Re-
cent evidence, however, supports these concerns. For example, the Par-
liamentary Commission on Banking Standards’ Report into HBOS 
(HBOS Report),117 records a 2004 self-assessment of the HBOS board’s 
performance, which concluded, “The Board made effective but suppor-
tive challenges, as necessary, and would not seek to second guess execu-
tive management’s formulation of strategy.”118 Yet the Combined Code 
of Corporate Governance that applied on a comply-or-explain basis to all 
U.K.-listed corporations made clear that it was the board that should set 
the corporation’s strategic aims and that non-executive directors should 
constructively challenge and help develop proposals on strategy.119 It is 
therefore startling that the HBOS board did not realize that the conclu-
sions in its self-assessment were far from satisfactory. 
The law may have contributed to this complacency. Courts have 
exonerated both non-executive120 and executive directors121 that relied on 
                                                        
 114. Id. at 1796–98; Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1269–70; Langevoort, supra note 112, at 
826–28; Rock & Wachter, supra note 34, at 1695–96; see also Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: 
How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997); Alex Geisinger, Are 
Norms Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and the Use of Norms As Private Regulation, 57 
ALA. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2005) (arguing that in addition to altering incentives for action, the law can 
redress “pluralistic ignorance,” i.e., mistaken assumptions regarding what the majority find accept-
able). 
 115. Renee M. Jones & Michelle Welsh, Towards a Public Enforcement Model for Directors’ 
Duty of Oversight, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 343, 369 (2012). 
 116. Id. at 368; see also Jones, supra note 22, at 130–31. 
 117. HBOS REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. This bank suffered aggregate pre-tax losses of £30 
billion between 2008 and 2011, primarily as a result of bad lending. 
 118. Id. at 30 (emphasis added). 
 119. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, COMBINED CODE 4 (2003), available at http://www.ucema. 
edu.ar/cegopp-base/download/TheCombinedCode.pdf . 
 120. In Re Continental Assurance of London PLC, [2007] 2 B.C.L.C. 287 (U.K.). 
 121. Norman v. Theodore Goddard, [1992] B.C.L.C. 14 (U.K.).  
2014] Breaching the Accountability Firewall 1009 
others who are experts in matters lying outside the directors’ expertise, 
provided that the directors exercised judgment in relation to the matters 
in question122 and, in the case of the non-executives, had probed, tested, 
and discussed the information provided by the experts as intelligent lay-
men.123 The HBOS Report found that both the non-executive and execu-
tive directors lacked banking expertise and so placed their faith in senior 
executives who had such expertise.124 The law could be interpreted as not 
unambiguously ruling out such reliance provided that, as the self-
assessment recorded, the directors made “effective and supportive chal-
lenges.” Of course, for the law to have influenced the directors, they had 
to be aware of it, but given that HBOS’s company secretary was head of 
its legal department,125 it could be expected that he would have commu-
nicated any concerns about its legal position. A further illustration is 
found in the RBS Report, which records that the RBS directors were le-
gally advised on whether they had given the acquisition of ABN Amro 
proper consideration. Presumably, despite the minimal due diligence, the 
advice was positive as the takeover proceeded.126 Consequently, assum-
ing directors pay attention to legal advice,127 communicating that the law 
sets a low standard of care may cause them to make less careful deci-
sions than they might otherwise. 
None of the above considerations for applying market norms sup-
port the FSA’s position in relation to RBS. The FSA was wrong to con-
clude that the RBS directors had acted in accordance with market prac-
tices governing due diligence in hostile takeovers. The ABN Amro take-
over was not like other takeovers. Hostile takeovers in the banking con-
text are extremely rare and, as the FSA noted, given its size this one was 
exceptional.128 What should be done in “very particular and highly indi-
vidualistic circumstances . . . is by no means a matter of practice. It is a 
matter of law to be resolved by judges.”129 In such circumstances, a find-
ing of negligence would not require an entire industry to change its prac-
tices, there are no special reasons for thinking that such conduct pro-
                                                        
 122. Id. at 18–21. 
 123. In Re Continental Assurance of London PLC, 2 B.C.L.C. at 402–03, 411. 
 124. HBOS REPORT, supra note 2, at 31. 
 125. Conference Report: The European Legal Summit 2004, LAWYER (Nov. 22, 2004), 
http://www.thelawyer.com/conference-report-the-european-legal-summit-2004/113004.article (rec-
ords that Harry Baines was company secretary in 2004); see also Tim Sharp, Baines Retires from 
Legal Role, HERALD SCOTLAND (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.heraldscotland.com/business/people/ 
baines-retires-from-legal-role.18424395. 
 126. FSA, supra note 2, at 227. 
 127. See generally Rock, supra note 114. 
 128. FSA, supra note 2, at 229. 
 129. Bown v. Gould & Swayne, [1996] P.N.L.R. 130 [135] (Simon-Brown L.J.) (U.K.). 
1010 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:989 
motes welfare, and directors could not reasonably believe that their con-
duct is an accepted practice. Admittedly, exposing those who engage in 
minority practices to a greater prospect of liability than those who adhere 
to common practices risks deterring innovation.130 Directors may con-
clude that it is safer to comply with existing practices than to try some-
thing new. Again, a useful practice could be held negligent thus prevent-
ing it from spreading. 
The case law on medical negligence suggests a solution: if an inno-
vative procedure is approved of by a body of responsible opinion, it is 
less likely to be found negligent.131 A similar approach could be adopted 
in corporate law. Nevertheless, stifling innovation is anathema to suc-
cessful entrepreneurship, and so there needs to be caution in holding 
even a one-off strategic board decision negligent, though not because of 
the considerations supporting respect for market norms. 
In sum, it would usually be fair, more efficient, less disruptive, and 
meet the expectations of those affected, for the reasonableness of direc-
tors’ conduct to be assessed against a standard that reflects market norms 
and, in particular, market practices. This will not always be appropriate, 
however, as the next section explains. 
B. Departing from Market Norms 
The argument that the public and private standard of care should 
always reflect market norms seems deeply unappealing in light of market 
participants’ conduct, which was irrational prior to the crisis, motivated 
by unrestrained greed, and even, as the LIBOR scandal showed, corrupt. 
This section explores in what circumstances it is permissible to depart 
from market norms and argues that this is allowable when the conduct 
impugned is irrational or scandalous, and occasionally when the conduct 
is merely negligent, but then only in limited circumstances such as when 
it involves a failure to take precautions against predictably serious risks. 
The discussion draws on professional negligence decisions in the 
United Kingdom, which are similar to U.S. medical negligence case 
law.132 These cases are of interest because, just as in the corporate law 
sphere, the courts’ approach may be shaped by concerns over institution-
al competence and the fear that increased liability could lead to defensive 
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decision making.133 There have also been attempts to rely on this case 
law to exonerate directors in regulatory proceedings.134 However, it is not 
proposed that the approach taken in these cases should be uncritically 
adopted because it has been justifiably criticized as placing professionals 
above the law135 and would fail to promote adequate accountability. Ra-
ther, the aim is to draw analogies in order to provide a framework for 
discussing when standard setting that departs from market norms might 
be permissible. 
Turning to case law, courts will find professional practices unrea-
sonable where they are unacceptable to the wider community.136 In A v. 
Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust, medical practitioners removed and 
retained the organs of deceased children for research purposes without 
informing their parents or seeking consent.137 There was a public outcry 
when this was discovered.138 Although this accorded with universal pro-
fessional practice at the time,139 the courts intervened to sanction behav-
ior that was so serious that it scandalized the public and flouted obliga-
tional norms of generalized morality. 
Second, courts will examine professional practice and obligational 
norms to ascertain whether they have a logical basis. If not, then conduct 
that accords with these will be negligent.140 For present purposes, this 
will be treated as a test of irrationality.141 
Third, both within and outside the field of professional negligence, 
courts will hold market practices unreasonable where these fail to take 
precautions against known or reasonably apparent risks.142 This includes 
risks that are rare but where the precaution needed is clear with minimal 
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costs.143 Thus, in E.B. Savory v. Lloyds Bank Ltd., the appeal court did 
not hesitate to direct the banking industry to change a commercially con-
venient practice that subverted a bank’s safeguards against a risk that had 
been identified by the bank itself.144 
The question is whether these grounds for departing from market 
norms can be justified given the previous arguments for adhering to 
norm-reflecting standards. Taking each of these arguments in turn, hold-
ing directors to account for flouting societal standards would not involve 
retrospective standard setting, contrary to the Rule of Law. Rather, it in-
volves the courts applying standards established ex ante, although admit-
tedly different from those that have evolved within the market. Similarly, 
when the market is dominated by irrational behavior, the values and con-
duct of market participants will usually diverge from that which is con-
sidered acceptable by community standards. Given that directors have, or 
should have, due notice of what societal standards are, there is no retro-
spectivity in holding them liable in such circumstances. And as they 
ought to know what is permissible, they can plan their conduct accord-
ingly. 
The E.B. Savory situation is more problematic. In this case, banks 
had recognized that they needed to take precautions against the risk that 
employees might steal checks from their employers.145 To guard against 
this, the bank had to know who employed their customers, who had 
drawn the checks, and to whom they had been made payable.146 Howev-
er, a practice had been introduced whereby customers could pay in 
checks at a branch (the receiving branch) other than the one where they 
had their account (the customer branch), and after it had cleared, they 
could withdraw the funds from the latter. Because the check in E.B. Sa-
vory was retained centrally at the Clearing House, problems arose be-
cause the receiving branch did not know who employed the customer, 
whilst the customer’s branch did not know who had drawn the check and 
to whom it had been made payable. It happened that two individuals ex-
ploited this situation by paying in stolen checks at a receiving branch and 
withdrawing the funds at their customer branch. This “commercially use-
ful”147 practice adopted by the bank had been followed for forty years 
without the banks or fraudsters spotting the problem.148 Arguably, there-
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fore, the risk was only apparent with hindsight, and in imposing liability 
the court engaged in retrospective standard setting. 
On the other hand, it seems likely that the bank did not spot the 
problem because it had not assessed the risks that the practice posed. Had 
it done so, it would (or should) have recognized the risk because it had 
already identified it ex ante. Holding market participants liable for failing 
to guard against risks that they would have recognized had they thought 
about it does not involve retrospective standard setting: the requirement 
to take reasonable care signals ex ante that persons should at least con-
sider the risks inherent in their conduct. 
The law, however, is already more likely to hold directors liable for 
breaching their duty of care when they fail to exercise judgment about 
risks.149 The real difficulty arises when directors argue that even if they 
had considered the risks, they would still have acted or failed to act in the 
impugned manner. It may be claimed that directors should not have taken 
the risk without adopting a particular precaution, or that they should not 
have taken the risk at all. This is problematic because directors are re-
quired to take, rather than avoid, risks and may legitimately choose to 
run an obvious risk. For these reasons, it has been argued that the duty of 
care is inconsistent with the director’s role.150 Yet directors are not 
unique in this respect: medical professionals also regularly choose to de-
liberately run risks and choose between different treatment options with 
uncertain outcomes,151 but they are nevertheless subject to a duty of care, 
albeit that the courts show great deference to their judgment. Again, 
while these considerations make it particularly problematic for the courts 
to find directors negligent when their conduct accords with market prac-
tice, permitting market practice to determine the requisite standard may 
be unsatisfactory. It would excuse decisions not to take precautions 
against serious risks on the grounds of costs, for example, despite pre-
dictably serious consequences for others. 
In professional negligence cases, the courts deal with analogous is-
sues by asking whether the need for a precaution, and the nature of the 
precaution required, would be obvious as a matter of lay common 
sense.152 This appeals to societal norms in preference to professional 
norms. The problem is that given the nature of business decisions, it is 
not clear that there would be many circumstances in which lay common 
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sense would be sufficiently informed to be able to make an accurate 
judgment about these matters.153 In such cases, the courts could look to 
relevant codes of conduct, industry standards, and other soft law instru-
ments, on the one hand, and use these to assess, on the other hand, both 
market practices and informal obligational market norms.154 In cases of 
conflict, the former should usually prevail, on the grounds that soft law 
norms reflect the considered views of market actors of acceptable con-
duct and are also more likely to incorporate community expectations. For 
example, in the United Kingdom, soft law norms emphasize that it is the 
board’s responsibility to ensure that there are regular and systematic as-
sessments of the risks facing their businesses and that internal control 
systems are instituted to manage risk.155 Yet, such systems were woefully 
lacking in banks in the run up to the financial crisis. Again, as David 
Millon recently argued, short-termism may be a prevalent market norm 
“that leads actors to assume uncritically that focus on current share prices 
at the expense of long-term fundamental value is appropriate.”156 In con-
trast, the U.K. Corporate Governance Code states that boards are collec-
tively responsible for the long-term success of their companies.157 This 
provision was introduced in 2010 to address the short-termism highlight-
ed by the financial crisis and in response to formal reform proposals.158 
The debate surrounding “enlightened shareholder value”159 and section 
172 of the Companies Act 2006,160 which requires directors to have re-
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gard for the long-term consequences of their decisions, may also have 
played a part. Therefore, the provision can be viewed as incorporating 
the law’s, the community’s, and informed market actors’ views of appro-
priate behavior as an attempt to alter market practices and, consequently, 
should be the preferred standard against which to measure directors’ 
conduct. 
Nevertheless, there needs to be some discretion over whether to ap-
ply soft law, as it often sets out best practice, and negligence lies in fail-
ing to comply with satisfactory practices, rather than best practice. Fur-
thermore, it may not be appropriate for all directors at all times; thus, the 
U.K. Code of Corporate Governance only applies to listed corporations, 
and even then, it can be departed from in appropriate circumstances.161 
In the absence of relevant soft law, a final option is to admit expert 
evidence about whether market participants considered the practice in 
question to be reasonable.162 This would involve measuring market prac-
tices against informal obligational market norms applicable at the rele-
vant time. It recognizes that what market participants do is not necessari-
ly what they think ought to be done. This is similar to the approach in 
medical negligence cases where the courts have held that a doctor was 
not negligent when he acted in accordance with a practice accepted at the 
time as proper by a responsible body of medical opinion skilled in the 
treatment in question.163 The reference to “proper” practice was thought 
to import a normative rather than a descriptive element.164 In other 
words, a doctor would not be exonerated simply because he complied 
with professional practice if the professional practice was not accepted as 
proper by professional experts. Retrospectivity would not be an issue 
where the courts chose between evidence regarding two preexisting sets 
of professional practices. The professional negligence cases, however, 
also established that even if just one body of responsible medical opinion 
supported the doctor’s practices, the doctor would be exonerated. It was 
irrelevant that another body of professional opinion considered her prac-
tices improper: the court could not prefer the latter opinion to the former 
and would not examine the relative merits of the two bodies of opinion. 
Expert evidence became conclusive of reasonable conduct and was criti-
cized as placing professionals above the law, and deferring to a director’s 
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expert in this manner would undermine accountability.165 However, even 
if retrospective standard setting is avoided, it is unclear on what basis the 
courts could choose one set of market or societal norms in preference to 
another, and this creates a risk of arbitrariness. If such a choice is to be 
made, its legitimacy must be assessed against other arguments for adher-
ing to market norms. 
Turning then to whether it is unfair to find directors liable when 
they are simply doing what others are doing, when societal expectations 
about what counts as appropriate conduct diverges sharply from market 
conduct, enforcement of a standard of care that reflects societal values 
rather than the market’s seems warranted, particularly if the conduct has 
given rise to accountability claims from the wider community. Holding 
market participants accountable to the law signals that they are not ex-
empt from the demands of community morality. Markets are, after all, 
embedded in society and exist to serve society’s aims. This is not neces-
sarily to advocate a stakeholder model of the corporation, that is, that 
judgments about the legitimacy of directors’ conduct should turn on how 
directors balance conflicting stakeholder interests.166 Rather, even if it is 
accepted that directors must promote shareholder interests (as U.K. law 
requires them to do),167 they should do so in a manner that does not vio-
late the mores of the wider community. 
Holding market actors accountable for egregious conduct does not 
necessarily involve prioritizing community values over market values. 
The behavior of market participants prior to the financial crisis, which 
was so destructive of the market, typically featured unrestrained greed 
that showed no respect for the interests of others. One explanation for 
this conduct was that market actors wrongly believed that unrestrained 
selfishness constituted the legitimate pursuit of self-interest and thus jus-
tified market behavior. However, the self-interest that is essential to the 
operation of the market respects the autonomy of other parties to the 
market exchange.168 Insofar as the pursuit of greed became not only a 
market practice but also an informal obligational norm, penalizing such 
conduct would not only deter such conduct but also erode the normative 
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effect of this “false” market value, to the benefit of the market and soci-
ety. 
Conduct that egregiously flouts community expectations, such as 
the conduct of the LIBOR traders, would usually be dealt with more ap-
propriately through rules governing fraud rather than the duty of care. It 
is also typically extremely difficult to link egregious conduct to directors. 
Directors’ ignorance about what is going on in their corporations is a 
common feature of corporate scandals and has contributed to the “ac-
countability firewall.”169 However, examples of actions that might be 
caught include decisions to award high levels of executive pay, though in 
the United Kingdom this has now been addressed through legislation,170 
or decisions to cause corporations to engage in reputation-damaging 
conduct, such as authorizing aggressive tax avoidance schemes that 
cause the corporation to cross the line of legality. This final example 
highlights the difficulties in ascertaining what the community’s shared 
values are. While these difficulties must not be minimized, this issue lies 
outside the scope of a discussion that focuses on market norms. For pre-
sent purposes, it is sufficient to note that certain types of conduct clearly 
evoke community condemnation and are captured by the exception. 
As for irrational conduct, the Rule of Law only requires the protec-
tion of rational and legitimate expectations about the law.171 However in 
the context of the financial crisis, while market conduct as whole was 
irrational, the conduct of market actors in continuing to take high risks 
may have been individually rational because it allowed them to maintain 
market share.172 Thus, when asked, “Aren’t you getting in over your head 
with all of these CDO investments and their problems of illiquidity?,” 
Charles Prince, then-CEO of Citigroup famously replied, “When the mu-
sic stops in terms of liquidity things will get complicated. But as long as 
the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still danc-
ing.”173 As Coffee pointed out, the directors saw problems on the hori-
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zon, but their fear of falling behind the competition was ever more com-
pelling.174 But even if this conduct was rational—which is challengeable 
given its implications for the long term interests of the participants175—it 
is not legitimate to expect the law to disregard reckless risk-taking sim-
ply because it is widespread or turn a blind eye to exploitative greed. 
Neither the Rule of Law nor considerations of fairness require this. 
The E.B. Savory category is again more difficult. On one hand, as-
suming that directors have not simply failed to consider the risks of a 
particular decision but reviewed them and acted in accordance with mar-
ket norms, fairness points away from liability. On the other hand, in 
cases where conflicting bodies of expert evidence reveal a division of 
market opinion regarding the propriety of directors’ conduct, directors 
cannot be taken completely by surprise if a court rules that their conduct 
was unreasonable. There is also less unfairness when a court’s judgment 
of reasonableness is informed by those conflicting market norms, rather 
than by an arbitrary judicial assessment of desirable market conduct. 
Nevertheless, the potential for unfairness remains, thus liability should 
only be imposed where there are countervailing considerations in its fa-
vor. For example, the need to be fair to directors might be overridden by 
the need to be fair to others. It may also be legitimate to impose liability 
when “in the light of common sense or newer knowledge, market prac-
tices were ‘clearly bad’”176—that is, where the practices were unreason-
able by community standards. 
Adhering to market practices was also justified on the basis that it 
would reflect the expectations of corporate constituents. Shareholders 
seemed happy when bank directors took excessive risks. Thus, RBS 
shareholders, who received dividends of 22% in 2006 and 23% in 
2007,177 were happy to acquiesce in the takeover of ABN Amro, later 
described as a gamble.178 This demonstrates that determining whether 
directors have taken acceptable risks cannot be left to shareholders when 
the decision imposes material externalities on other persons. For exam-
ple, the ABN Amro takeover led to the collapse of RBS, which adversely 
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impacted employees, borrowers, and taxpayers. Considerations of ac-
countability require that the expectations of the creditors and the wider 
community regarding acceptable conduct should count in such circum-
stances. 
Finally, irrational market behavior cannot be defended as efficient 
or welfare maximizing. Behavior that flouts societal values might meet 
these criteria,179 but efficiency and welfare maximization should not 
override community norms in guiding the law’s response to such con-
duct. Conversely, the law must reflect and accommodate other important 
values such as fairness, justice, and respect for others as ends in them-
selves.180 Behavior is egregious often, if not always, because it offends 
some or all of these values, and this in turn is what renders the need for 
accountability. 
But yet again, courts and regulators must be cautious about im-
pugning conduct that only reaches the level of negligence like that in 
E.B. Savory. In that case, the appeal court noted that the precautions 
needed to remove the risk were very straightforward, which suggests that 
the court weighed the costs of the precautions against the benefits and 
found that this pointed in favor of taking precautions.181 It is unclear 
whether this influenced the court’s assessment of reasonableness,182 but 
in the absence of a cost–benefit analysis, there is a risk that efficient 
practices could be found negligent. Even if the courts did undertake such 
an analysis, it is far from certain that it would be accurate. There will, 
though, be times when the outcome of a cost–benefit calculation is clear 
and when a finding of unreasonableness will not disrupt an efficient 
practice, but this is likely to be rare given the complexity of business de-
cisions. 
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In sum, arguments against departing from market norms do not 
prevail where the conduct in question is irrational or contrary to social 
mores. It is more difficult to defend finding directors’ negligent in an 
E.B. Savory type case. Although many of the impugned decisions made 
by directors would fall within this category, such a conclusion does not 
render the “accountability firewall” unassailable. First, irrational and 
scandalous conduct could not be excused even if it was widespread mar-
ket conduct. Second, the examination of the U.K. legal position suggests 
that using market norms to judge directors’ behavior could increase in-
stances of directors’ liability and thus promote accountability. Third, 
even in an E.B. Savory-type case, it will be possible to find directors lia-
ble, albeit in limited circumstances. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article concludes by highlighting issues of wider importance 
raised by the discussion. The first is who is best placed to make judg-
ments that depart from market norms, the courts or regulators. Regulators 
can set higher standards than the market ex ante, but they are less well- 
placed to do so ex post. Unlike the courts, they can be, or perceived to 
be, influenced by political concerns and self-interest.183 This perception 
is likely to be strong where the regulator enforces norms that diverge 
from those of the market and will pose risks to the regulator’s legitimacy. 
Legitimacy with the regulated is critical as it reduces challenges to the 
regulator’s authority, thus enhancing the effectiveness of the regulatory 
framework. While these concerns apply even when the regulator articu-
lates standards that depart from the market’s ex ante, they would be 
greatly exacerbated when it does so ex post. To strive for legitimacy, the 
regulator must not only promote Rule of Law values that law should be 
certain, stable, and prospective, but also the regulatory values of trans-
parency, openness, and participation.184 A standard of reasonableness 
that is given content ex post could flout these requirements. On the other 
hand, penalizing conduct that offends against shared community values 
would not offend against the principle of retrospectivity, and it is a regu-
lator’s public interest role to give expression to community values within 
the parameters of its regulatory objectives. Furthermore, legitimacy with 
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the regulated cannot be a conclusive factor governing the content of the 
regulatory standard of care: society may wish some kinds of behavior to 
be controlled regardless of the perception of the regulated about those 
controls. If the regulator fails to respond to these expectations, it risks 
losing legitimacy with the public, a situation that Black has referred to as 
a regulatory “legitimacy paradox,”185 because the steps regulators may 
need to take to satisfy one constituency will deprive them of legitimacy 
in the eyes of another. One response to this paradox is for broad regula-
tory standards such as reasonableness to be enforced by the regulator 
through the courts. In the United Kingdom, in context of financial ser-
vices, the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery) can perform this legitimis-
ing judicial role, but not many cases are referred to it because of incen-
tives to settle with the regulator.186 Moreover, the Upper Tribunal (Tax 
and Chancery) will not become involved where the regulator decides not 
to take action at all. The FSA’s inertia following the financial crisis high-
lights the problems of a regulator enforcing a broad standard of reason-
ableness where it believes that the conduct in question either reflects 
market practices or has not been ruled out by formal ex ante norms. The 
risk of inertia is heightened since respecting market norms will safeguard 
the regulator’s legitimacy with the regulated. This raises issues of regula-
tory accountability. 
Meanwhile, leaving the directors’ duty of care under section 174 of 
the Companies Act of 2006 to private enforcement means, as far as pub-
lic corporations are concerned, that there will be no enforcement at all, 
particularly in those cases where the accountability deficit is most 
acute—where directors’ conduct imposes material costs on persons other 
than the shareholders. It has been argued that the duty of care owed by 
all directors to their corporations should be subject to a greater degree of 
enforcement, and others have argued that this could be achieved through 
public enforcement through the courts.187 This raises the question of what 
the relationship should be between a director’s regulatory duty of care 
and a director’s duty of care under the Companies Act of 2006. There 
seems little reason for the role of market norms to be different under ei-
ther regime. It is, however, unclear to what extent judicial decisions un-
der a regulatory regime should take account of decisions applying section 
174 and vice versa, or to what extent formal regulatory standards would 
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influence judgments of reasonableness under section 174. These issues 
require further exploration.188 
Unless judges, however, are prepared to take greater account of 
market norms, they are likely to give directors the benefit of the doubt 
and set a low standard of care. Public enforcement will not resolve this 
issue. Regulatory failure in financial services suggests that public en-
forcement of directors’ duty of care will fail unless the regulator can be 
more confident about when behavior that accords with market practices 
will be held culpable by the courts: in the absence of greater certainty, 
the regulator will be reluctant to even instigate proceedings. This Article 
suggests how market norms should be treated. There may be disagree-
ment about whether its conclusions are over- or under-protective of mar-
ket norms, but the role they play in identifying a reasonable director is a 
critical factor in the wider debate over directors’ accountability. 
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